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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (Second Edition, Volume
I). By Kenneth Gulp Davis. Published by K.C. Davis, 1978.
Pp. xiv, 634. Price $45.00.
ROBERT W. HAMILTON t

Those who know Kenneth Culp Davis find it not at all surprising that at the age of seventy he is embarking on the ambitious
venture of rewriting his multi-volume treatise on administrative
law.' Over the years Davis has been a prodigious scholar, publishing many provocative books and articles,2 as well as massive supplements and revisions to his original multi-volume treatise. His
seminal books on the control of discretion and discretionary justices
opened areas for study that previously had been thought to be
intractable.
Promotional material accompanying volume one of the revised
treatise states that the complete work will consist of four or five
volumes. So far only the first, dealing with six areas of administrative law,4 has been published. The problems of preparing and
maintaining a treatise on a subject as complex and changing as
administrative law are formidable: Davis has also recently published
a 300-page supplement to his original treatise pending the complef Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
A.B. 1952, Swarthmore; J.D. 1955, University of Chicago.
I This treatise was originally published in four volumes in 1958. K. DAvIs,
After several pocket part supplements,
ADmns rsTiv LAW TnATSE (1958).
Davis published a 1970 supplement of 1154 pages, id. (Supp. 1970), and thereafter
a single volume in 1976, K. DAvis, AiDmNsTRAT vE LAw OF = SEvEms (Supp.
1976) [hereinafter cited as ADmmsTRATvE LAw OF = SvENrms]. This volume
has itself been supplemented by pocket parts.
2 A sampling of the triennial volumes of the Index to Legal Periodicals going
back to 1943 reveals at least one entry-and often four, five, or six entries-in each
volume under Davis" name. A complete bibliography of Davis' legal writing is well
beyond the scope of this review.
3 K. DAvis, DISCETION ARY JusTicE: A Pmm.mNAnY INQumY (1969); K. DAvis,
DISCarlONARY JUSTICE xN EURoPE AND AmanIcA (1976); K. DAVIs, POLICE DIs(1975).
The six topics can be gleaned from the volume's six chapter titles: "The
Administrative Process" (which includes some historical material, but also covers
state administrative law and informal action); "Philosophical Foundations"; "Delegation and Subdelegation"; "Investigation"; "The Freedom of Information Act and
Related Legislation'; and "Rulemaking Procedure."
CREION
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tion of the new edition.5 Revising the entire treatise is an ambitious project, and Davis' decision to tackle it is admirable.
Of the six topics covered in volume one, the most important
and controversial concerns rulemaking procedures. Davis' discussion of this subject-and particularly his analysis and criticism of
the Supreme Court's decision last spring in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.6-is particularly provocative. Because of the importance and
timeliness of this discussion, the bulk of this review is devoted to
rulemaking procedures. Before turning to these issues, however, it
may be helpful to give an overall impression of the work.
I.

GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE VOLUME

Much of the volume is new in that it has been rewritten to
integrate recent developments; for example, there is extensive analysis of recent developments under the Freedom of Information Act.7
As one would naturally expect, some of the discussion is quite
similar to Davis' latest supplement, Administrative Law of the
Seventies.8 On balance though, a surprising amount of it is new.
By and large Davis has done a tremendous job of integrating
the numerous and disparate strands of doctrine. His treatment of
current rulemaking procedures illustrates the difficulty of this task.
I wrote two law review articles on this subject in the early 1970's 9
and prided myself on having kept up with developments in this
fast-moving area since then. However, after reading Davis' treatment of the same material, I realized how many developments I had
not fully explored and how many trends and interrelationships
among the same cases I had failed to notice. In short, I do not see
how anyone seriously following or practicing administrative law can
ignore this book.
5 K. DAvis, ADMINsTRATVE LAW TREATISE (Supp. Oct 1978). The 1978
supplement is actually designed as a pocket part to the 1976 supplement, AnnmSRATnrVE LAw OF = SEV.NTES, supra note 1. Together these two supplements
cover law developments since 1970 and supersede the original volumes in usefulness,
because of the profound changes in administrative law that occurred during the
past decade.
6 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For an extensive discussion of this case, and of Davis'
reaction to it, see text accompanying notes 64-84 infra.
7 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
8 ADn a

=zrrvE
LAw oF

=

S

mv~vrri's, supra note 1.

Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALF. L. Rv.
1276 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Procedural Innovation]; Hamilton, Rulemaking
on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TExAs L. REv. 1132 (1972).
9
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This is not a perfect treatise, however. Primarily, it suffers
from too much subjectivity, a troublesome quality in a work so
widely regarded as "the" treatise on administrative law. 10 Throughout, the volume reflects the strong personality and views of its
author. Davis can be brilliant, innovative, persuasive, argumentative, stubborn, impossible, and in a few cases at least, wrong. He
tends to classify the world into white hats and black hats with no
room for any grays. Further, he holds views tenaciously, totally and
honestly convinced of their correctness.
Strongly held views appear throughout the volume. For example, the "reverse FOIA" decisions by three courts of appeals prohibiting agencies' disclosure of information involve "an extraordinary twisting of meaning," and they lead to "demonstrably
unsound" "- conclusions. In a similar vein, Davis calls the result
reached by the majority of the Supreme Court in M~farshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,12 relating to OSHA inspections, "hard to square with
either the statute or the Fourth Amendment." 13 Moreover, Davis
finds that, "except for stating conclusions, [the majority opinion]
said nothing that answered Mr. Justice Stevens' demonstration" 14
in his dissent. 1 Throughout, comments and cases with which he
agrees are labelled "sound," 16 "surely unanswerable," 17 "reliable," 18 "outstanding," 19 "solid," 20 or "strong"; 21 those with which
he disagrees are "surprising," 22 "unsatisfactory," 23 "curious," 24
"astonishing," 25 "unsound," 26 or simply "wrong." 27
10 In the promotional material accompanying the volume, Davis states that a
computerized search reveals the combination of "Davis" and "Administrative Law"
in 59 Supreme Court opinions, 803 federal courts of appeals opinions, and 508
opinions of federal district courts. Such citations occur "often several times in one
opinion."
11 1 K. DAvIs, ADmnmTmRTrvE LAW TREATISE 334 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter

cited as TnEATIsE].
12436 U.S. 307 (1978).
13 TR
14 Id.

SEpAs,
supra note 11, § 4:11, at 258.

15 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 See, e.g., TREATisE, supra note 11, §§ 5:7, at 327, :8, at 330, :9, at 336, 337,
:13, at 354, :31, at 396.
17 See, e.g., id. § 4:21, at 290.

38 See, e.g., id. §§ 5:8, at 332, 6:12, at 502.
19 See, e.g., id. §§ 5:39, at 434, 6:6, at 466, :8, at 489, :15, at 520.
20

See, e.g., id. § 5:8, at 330, 332.
21 See, e.g., id. §§ 4:13, at 263, :15, at 273, 5:8, at 331, :13, at 354, :14, at 356.
22 See, e.g., id. §§ 4:11, at 259, :24, at 303, 5:9, at 334.
23 See, e.g., id. §§ 5:9, at 336, :31, at 395, :37, at 416.
24 See, e.g., id. § 4:7, at 247.
25 See, e.g., id. § 5:6, at 323.
26 See, e.g., id. §§ 5:7, at 326, :9, at 334, :35, at 409.
27
See, e.g., id. §§ 4:24, at 304, 5:9, at 335, 336.
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One of Davis' principal biases is in favor of judicial activism.
For example, he declares at the outset that "judges should make new
law whenever they rightly discern that new law is desirable," 2 and
that when they developed rulemaking procedures for agencies from
whole cloth, the federal courts were at "their creative best." 29
Needless to say, these particular biases are not shared by a majority
of the present United States Supreme Court; so, it is not surprising0
that some recent Supreme Court decisions are roundly criticized.3
Davis even devotes the major part of a section to a systematic criticism of the procedures followed by the Supreme Court itself.81
Among all courts and all agencies, the one that makes
the most major policy with insufficient procedural protection is the Supreme Court of the United States. No other
court and no agency makes so much major policy. Yet the
Supreme Court rarely measures up to the requirements
federal courts have imposed on federal rulemaking agenrespect to the factual ingredient of policycies with
32
making.
Davis acknowledges at the outset that his thinking is "unashamedly subjective" 33 and that the treatise represents "a good
deal more" than the collection, organization, and summary of the
relevant law. 4 Of course, wearing one's biases openly on one's
sleeve, as Davis does, is much better than not acknowledging them
28

Id. xi.

29Id. xiii.
80 The most notable example is the twelve-page discussion, see TREATISE, supra
note 11, §§ 6:35-:37, in which Davis attempts to narrow or nullify the effect of
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 64-84 infra.
For another example of Davis' subjective approach, see TREAnTSE, supra note
11, § 4:24, in which Davis attacks the views of those justices who favor strictly

literal interpretations of the protections given by the fourth and fifth amendments.
81 See TREAT-sE, supra note 11, § 6:38.
82 Id. § 6:38, at 618.
Davis goes on to demonstrate his point with this example:
If Mr. Justice Blackmun goes to the Mayo Clinic's medical library in
Rochester, Minnesota, to develop facts about abortion as a basis for a judicial opinion, he and his brethren are free to use the facts as a part of the
Court's opinion, without giving parties adversely affected a pre-decision
chance to meet the facts or to argue against them.

Id. 620.
I should perhaps add that I believe that Davis' point about the court's extrarecord research on issues of broad policy and on factual matters has considerable
force.

Id. x.
84 Id.
8

1979]

BOOK REVIEW

at all, and infinitely better than not even realizing that one has
them. Still, one could have hoped for a bit more measured and
impartial review of admittedly highly controversial issues in the
revision of a book so widely relied upon and acclaimed. 35 However, that is not Davis' way.
Furthermore, like Davis' original treatise, this volume consists
almost entirely of litigated cases and legislative materials,3 6 although
there are occasional references to rules of practice and agency proceedings scattered throughout the text. An ideal administrative
law treatise should give more emphasis to the latter than Davis did,
even though a systematic effort along that line would be an immense and perhaps impossible undertaking. If Davis had looked
more at the actual agency experience with some of the novel rulemaking procedural requirements, for example, I suspect that his
enthusiasm for them might have been lessened to some extent.3 7
Further, the volume has several minor flaws. For example, its
index is wholly inadequate for most practitioners and should be
improved. Single entries for "Investigation-incrimination," "Jurisprudence," or "Gross-examination" without some further subcategories are not helpful. Moreover, there is no tabular index
of references to either the Federal Register or the Code of Federal
Regulations. Nor are there entries in the index for the various
agencies discussed in the text, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Immigration and Naturalization Service. One would
expect to find each of these types of references indexed in an administrative law treatise. Fortunately, the present index is printed
separately from the book itself. Because Davis plans to revise the
index as each new volume is published, he has the opportunity to
expand and improve it.
One final point deserves mention. Perhaps this is a matter of
personal preference more than anything else, but I am not comfortable with a multi-volume treatise that has all source references
in the text, rather than in footnotes. This use of textual references
not only distracts the reader, but also probably results in the elimination of some useful further elaboration that could have been
placed in a footnote without interfering with the text itself.
3

5See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
6This point was made strongly by a practicing attorney in a review of the
original treatise. See Westwood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Practitioner,
43 MnN. L. REv. 607 (1959).
37
See note 102 infra. See also Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI L. REv.
401, 425-45 (1975).
3
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Of course, none of these faults significantly detracts from the
book's basic strength. I expect that the entire treatise, when completed, will be as useful in the coming decade as the original was
in the 1960's.
II. RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
The current controversy over rulemaking procedures can best
be appreciated by outlining its historical development.
Until approximately 1970, rulemaking procedure was not
particularly controversial. The Administrative Procedure Act 3 8
("APA") classifies rulemaking procedures into two 39 well understood types:
(1) "Informal" or "notice-and-comment" rulemaking, made
pursuant to section 553 of the Act, involves publication of a notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register (including "either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved"); 40 an opportunity for "interested
persons ...

to participate in the rulemaking through submission of

written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation"; 41 and a final notice in the Federal Register
promulgating the final rule, including "a concise general statement
of [its] basis and purpose"; 42 and
(2) "Formal" rulemaking, or "rulemaking on a record" requires
the agency to follow the essentially adjudicative procedures set forth
in sections 556 and 557 of the Act.43

These include a formal trial-

type hearing before an administrative law judge, sworn testimony,
cross-examination, and an ultimate decision based solely on the record created at the hearing. Although the Act permits a certain
amount of flexibility, it was generally recognized that "rulemaking
on a record" was slow, inefficient, and poorly suited to resolving the
kind of broad issues usually addressed in rulemaking.44
385 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
39 Technically,

there

is

a third type: rulemaking without any external proce-

dures at all, made pursuant to one or more of the exemptions contained in 5 U.S.C.
§553. See id. §553(a), (b)(A), (b)(B).
40 Id.

§ 553(b)(3).
41Id. § 553(c).
42 Id.

43 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976). The "formal" procedures enumerated in these
sections become applicable whenever statutes require that rulemaking be conducted
"on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
44
See generally Procedural Innovation, supra note 9. See also TREATsE,
supra note 11, § 6:8. The United States Supreme Court has reduced the potential
scope of these formal rulemaking requirements by narrowly construing the critical
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Davis concluded in his 1970 supplement that informal noticeand-comment rulemaking was "one of the greatest inventions of
modem government." 45 In 1978, Davis' new volume declares that
the changes made in rulemaking procedures since 1970 "are so
broad and so deep that they are properly called revolutionary," 46
and that the "greatest invention" has been "vastly improved." 47
The "revolutionary" improvements in informal rulemaking procedures, which are described fully in Chapter Six,48 were prompted
by several factors. First, the late 1960's and early 1970's were a
period of unprecedented governmental regulatory activity affecting
broad areas of the economy. And, as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner,49 it was clear

that all such rules were subject to pre-enforcement judicial review.
However, simple notice-and-comment rulemaking (conducted pursuant to the minimum requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act), although efficient from the standpoint of the agency, does
not provide an adequate or satisfactory basis for meaningful preenforcement judicial review. 50 Nor does it give those who may be
significantly and seriously affected by the proposed rule a very satisfactory assurance that their views have received careful consideration from the agency.5 1 In statute after statute Congress struggled
language, quoted in note 43 supra, which triggers the requirements. See United
States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
45K.DAvis, AnmmTnA=rv LAW TAEATISE § 6.15 (Supp. 1970).
4 6
TREpATisE, supra note 11, § 6:1, at 449.
47 Id. 448.
481Id. §§ 6:1-:31.
49387 U.S. 136 (1967).
50
See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
in which the Court remanded a proceeding to the agency "to supply an implementing statement that will enlighten the court as to the basis" on which it established
a secondary air quality standard, which was being contested. Id. 850. The court
demanded further explanation, even while recognizing that the statement accompanying the regulations had met the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Id. The
Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA") thereafter published supplemental statements for the regulations it had previously adopted. See, e.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 5,767
(1972).
51 Indeed, unless the agency responds to comments, the affected person may
never know whether the comment was even read. Before 1970 agencies often dismissed objections rather curtly. For example, in promulgating significant regulations relating to stationary sources of air pollution in 1971, the EPA dismissed a
large number of critical comments with these two sentences:
In the comments on the proposed standards, many questions were raised
as to costs and demonstrated capability of control systems to meet the
standards. These comments have been evaluated and investigated, and it
is the Administrator's judgment that emission control systems capable of
meeting the standards have been adequately demonstrated and that the
standards promulgated herein are achievable at reasonable costs.
36 Fed. Reg. 24,876-77 (1971).
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to strike a balance between these factors, coupling grants of rulemaking authority with additional procedural requirements designed
52
to insure greater outside participation and broader judicial review.
Some of these procedures, such as those imposed on certain Federal
Trade Commission rulemaking by the Magnuson-Moss amendments, 53 are extremely elaborate.
During the same period the courts, particularly the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, responded to essentially the
same concerns by developing what Davis describes as a "common
law" 54 of rulemaking. In several instances the courts remanded
rulemaking proceedings to the agencies, ordering them to provide
fuller descriptions of the reasons for their decisions; 15 to describe
the procedures they used for evaluating certain information; 56 and
to conduct additional proceedings of a largely unspecified nature or,
in a few instances, with specific provision for cross-examination on
"critical questions." 57 Several of these opinions involve full and
careful review of complex technical or scientific issues by judges to
determine whether the decision had a reasonable basis under all
the circumstances. 58 A commentator familiar with the internal
operations of the Environmental Protection Agency has praised
these cases by noting that "the best hope for detailed, effective review of complex regulations is the judiciary," and that the courts'
"factual probing" in these opinions was "several times more detailed than [any that] the regulations at issue had received since
they were first written." 59 One issue that divided the District of
Columbia Circuit was whether judges should engage in such factual probing on complex issues, or whether they should limit their
52

See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058
(1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (1976).
53 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
54

TA
SEAs,
supra note 11, at 449-50.
55 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 481,
488 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
56
See, e.g., Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d
Cir. 1976).
57
1nternational Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (cross-examination); accord, Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009,
1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (right to make oral presentation to agency officials upheld;
cross-examination may be required on the "crucial issues").
58
See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
59

(1975).

Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38, 59
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review to the reasonableness of the procedures followed. 0 Davis
refers to the latter position as "the Bazelon Heterodoxy." 61
In summarizing these trends, Davis concludes that both Congress and the courts were gradually developing the entirely new
concept of a "rulemaking record" that would contain enough information to permit effective judicial review without imposing on
agencies the excessive, trial-type procedural burdens of "rulemaking on a record." 02 "Seldom in the history of the Anglo-American
judiciary," Davis rather dramatically concludes, "have the courts
been so creative, and perhaps never before has so much interaction
occurred between new thinking of judges and new thinking of
legislators." 13
Then came Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion last spring in
Vermont Yankee.64 The case involved a rule adopted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to deal generically with the problem
of assessing the cost of future nuclear waste management in the
licensing of nuclear reactors. In developing this rule, the agency
employed procedures in addition to those required by the Administrative Procedure Act: besides soliciting written comments, the
agency appointed a three-member board that conducted an oral, legislative-type hearing. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, remanded the proceeding to the agency,
which, the court held, had "uncritically relied on... extremely vague
assurances by agency personnel that problems as yet unsolved
[would] be solved."0 5 In writing for the court, Judge Bazelon con60 References to this debate appear both in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
66-68 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) and again in the dialogue between Judge Bazelon
and Judge Tanm in their Vermont Yankee opinions. Compare National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633,
655-57 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (separate statement of Bazelon, CJ.), reo'd sub nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) with Vermont Yankee, 547 F.2d at 658-61 (separate statement

of Tamm, J.).

61 ThE&=TSiz supra note 11, § 6:35, at 607.
62Id. §§ 6:1, 6:10. As Davis has pointed out, a great deal of confusion is
generated by the linguistic similarity in the two terms "rulemaking on a rulemaking
record" and "rulemaking on the record." In fact, they embody entirely distinct
concepts. The latter requires trial-type procedures pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557.
See text accompanying note 43 supra. A "rulemaking record," on the other hand,
accompanies section 553 proceedings. It refers to the bundle of materials that
specific agencies are now required by statute to compile and submit to the court as
an aid to its reviewing the promulgated rule.
6
3TREAns, supra note 11, § 6:1, at 449.
6
4Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
6
5 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee

864

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12.7:855

cluded that the record developed by the agency was "insufficient...
to sustain a rule limiting consideration of the environmental effects
of nuclear waste disposal." 66 The court, however, did not specify
the precise procedures to be followed on remand; instead, it left
the choice of appropriate procedures to the discretion of the agency,
after observing that "[m]any procedural devices for creating a genuine dialogue on these issues [are] available." 67 Judge Tamm, who
concurred only in the result, protested the open-ended nature of the
remand because he feared that such remands would result in the
"over-formalization" of the rulemaking proceeding. 6
He also
broadly intimated that on the existing record the rule could not be
supported under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial
review.

69

The United States Supreme Court emphatically reversed in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and concurred in by
all seven participating justices.70 The language of the opinion is
so harsh 71 that Davis appropriately comments that "[t]he Supreme
Court was not only reversing the Court of Appeals but was seemingly castigating it." 72 The most important statements in the case
concern court-imposed procedures in rulemaking:
[In two earlier cases], we held that generally speaking
[section 553] of the Act established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have
the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking
procedures. Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the
agencies have not chosen to grant them. This is not to say
necessarily that there are no circumstances which would
ever justify a court in overturning agency action because of
a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by
the statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are
extremely rare.
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519

(1978).
66 Id.
671d.

68 Id.660 (Tamm, J., concurring in the result).
69 Id. 661 & n.11.
70
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell did not

participate.
71 The Court said, for example, that the lower court was "wrong," id.
542, 550;

that it "'had seriously misread or misapplied" applicable law, id. 525; and that it
bad engaged
in "Monday morning quarterbacking," id. 547.
72
TpATsE,supra note 11, § 6:35, at 606.
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Even apart from the Administrative Procedure Act
this Court has for more than four decades emphasized
that the formulation of procedures was basically to be
left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judg73
ments.
The Court returned to the same theme in a later part of its
.opinion, commenting that it "is absolutely dear [that a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the
'administrative agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules
of procedure ....

....

7

Indeed, Mr. Justice Rehnquist declared

that this principle was a "very basic tenet of administrative law," 75
and that "our cases could hardly be more explicit in this regard." 76
Moreover, he stated that the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act "leaves little doubt that Congress intended that
the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed."
Finally, the Court emphasized the dangers of judicial
intrusion: if agencies were forced to operate under a "vague injunction to employ the 'best' procedures . . . [they] would un-

doubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance."7 8
This, in turn, would "totally disrupt the statutory scheme" ,9 with
the result that the advantages of informal rulemaking would be
"totally lost."

80

All of this is strong language that is fundamentally inconsistent with Davis' basic thesis. Davis responds with a frontal attack: these statements, he argues, should not be taken literally and
should be read merely as a rejection of Judge Bazelon's "procedural
emphasis." 81 After pointing out that Vermont Yankee did not
involve at least a dozen procedural questions addressed by lower
courts in the past, 2 Davis concludes that "the broad language that
7

3 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (footnote omitted).
74

Id.

543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)

(quoting

FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940))).
75Id. 544.
76 Id.
7Id.
546 (emphasis in original).
78 Id. 546-47.

547.
80Id. (footnote omitted).
79 Id.
81

TFALSE, supra note 11, § 6:36, at 609. For a discussion of Judge Bazelon's
position, see text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
8
2 TnxAsE, supra note 11, § 6:36, at 609-10.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

866

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:855

courts may not add to the procedural requirements of § 553 probably was not intended to apply to any of the dozen questions or to
other similar questions."8 3 The emphasis is supplied by Davis himself, who ends his discussion with this remarkable comment:
The Vermont Yankee opinion is largely one of those
rare opinions in which a unanimous Supreme Court
speaks with little or no authority. The Court lacks power
to change the law through sweeping generalizations that
are unsupported by close analysis. When the Court is
unanimous, it has enormous power to change the law by
carefully considering all facets of the problem before it
and by systematically answering the reasonable questions
about the problem that an informed person would raise.
The Vermont Yankee opinion is not that kind of opinion.8
III. FUTuWE REVIsIONS OF RULEMAKING PROCEURES
The Court's sweeping language and the ambiguity of its holding in Vermont Yankee raise many questions ultimately left unanswered in the opinion. In the balance of this review I will
briefly address three of the most important issues remaining: (1)
the effect of Vermont Yankee on the future scope of judicial review, (2) the effect of the judiciary's diminished power to order
agencies to use additional procedures, and, (3)a possible plan for
legislative action in response to Vermont Yankee.
(1) Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion clearly establishes that the
Court was deciding only whether the Court could review the adequacy of the agency's procedures, and not whether the rule itself
might be considered "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 In fact, the case was remanded to the court
of appeals with explicit directions that it review the rule "as the
83Id. 610 (emphasis in original).
84 Id.

§ 6:37, at 616.

85

In at least two passages the Court acknowledges the narrow scope of its
holding and reminds the court below that it is still free to exercise substantive review
on remand. First, while discussing the issue of mootness, the Court states:

Upon remand, the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals is
entirely free to agree or disagree with Judge Tamrm's conclusion that the

rule pertaining to the back end of the fuel cycle under which petitioner
Vermont Yankee's license was considered is arbitrary and capricious within
the meaning of . . . [§ 706] of the Administrative Procedure Act . . .

even though it may not hold, as it did in its previous opinion, that the
rule is invalid because of the inadequacy of the agency procedures.
435 U.S. 519, 536 n.14 (1978).
The same point is reiterated in a later portion of the text. Id. 549.
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,Administrative Procedure Act provides"; 86 that is, under the "ar-bitrary and capricious" standard. The Court, however, ordered
this review to be made solely on "'the administrative record,'" and
7
to be limited to the agency's "'finding' " based on that record.
Thus, Vermont Yankee does not explicitly narrow the scope of
substantive judicial review. It may well have that effect indirectly,
however, if agencies revert to the pre-1970 practice of publishing
only a "concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose"
that reveals little about the reasoning behind the agency's decision. 8
This is probably unlikely for several reasons. First, most agencies
by now are in the habit of rendering full explanations for their
rulings; this practice may well continue on its own momentum.
Second, such a development appears to be inconsistent with the
1978 Presidential Executive Order on rulemaking procedures. 9
Third, the lower courts, and even the Supreme Court, probably
will continue to insist on full explanations as a requirement of
judicial review under the APA rather than as an "additional procedure" not required by the APA. 90 Full explanations thus prob86 Id.
87 Id.

(quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)). The citation to
-Camp only adds confusion. In Camp the reviewing court sought to remedy an
agency's inadequate record by ordering a trial de novo at the district court level.
In a brief per curiam opinion the Supreme Court held that the Administrative
Procedure Act does not give the reviewing court itself the power to supplement or
supplant the agency's record; when an agency's record is so inadequate that it cannot
-form the basis for meaningful judicial review, the proper course is to remand the
.case to the agency. The Court continues to assume-contrary to fact-that an
,administrative record actually exists in connection with all informal decisions. See
Pederson, supra note 59, at 62-64.
88 See text accompanying note 41 supra. The same point is implicit in Davis'
,discussion of the pre-1970 precedents involving judicial review of informal rulemaking. See TnExr=s, supra note 11, § 6:12, at 498.
For an example of the terse notices announcing the adoption of rules in the pre1970 period, see note 51 supra.
89
Exec. Order No. 12,044 ("Improving Government Regulations"), 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,661 (1978), requires each agency to prepare a "regulatory analysis," which
-must be made public when its rule is published. Id. 12,663. The analysis must
include "a succinct statement of the problem; a description of the major alternative
ways of dealing with the problem that were considered by the agency; an analysis
.of the economic consequences of each of these alternatives and a detailed explanation
,of the reasons for choosing one alternative over the others." Id.
90The clearest indication of the Supreme Court's attitude toward full explanation of agency action appears in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975),
in which the Court pointed out that a statement of reasons was necessary "to
,enable the reviewing court intelligently to review the Secretary's determination."
Id. 571. Without such a statement, reviewing courts would be unable to determine
-whether agency action "'has been exercised in a manner that is neither arbitrary
nor capricious."' Id. 571 (quoting DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 383
(D.D.C. 1969)).
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing only for himself, stated that the Administrative
,Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(c), required a statement of reasons, and that "ftthis
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ably will not be considered as falling within Vermont Yankee's
broad proscription.
The phrase "arbitrary and capricious" obviously has flexibility.
Indeed, Davis concludes that there is no real difference between
that standard and the "substantial evidence" standard in terms of
scope of review. 91 Judge Tamm's opinion in Vermont Yankee
demonstrates that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard has substantive meaning: Judge Tamm suggested that, when measured
against this standard, the agency's record was inadequate to support its rule. For this reason, he voted to remand the case to the
agency.92 If this standard is generously construed in that way, then
the same kind of probing review that occurred in cases prior to
Vermont Yankee will probably continue to occur in the future. In
my judgment, such review is important not only to assure the development of reasonable rules but also to improve and structure the
agencies' internal decisionmaking processes.
(2) If it is true, as I have argued, that the courts are still able
to make a probing review of the substance of an agency's decision
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, then one might
wonder how much has been lost as a result of Vermont Yankee's
command that courts no longer may direct agencies to institute additional procedures on remand. My impression is that whatever
powers have been lost are not nearly as important as Davis fears
them to be. The only study of the actual effect of these remandsa study which Davis, surprisingly, neither cites nor refers to-concludes that the remanded proceedings did not yield any dramatic
improvements. 93 Moreover, there has never been general agreement that such remands are desirable. There is a real danger that
an agency, when faced with a general remand for additional unspecified procedures, might utilize undesirable trial-type proceedground, in my view, furnishes a sounder reason for concluding that a statement of

reasons must be furnished than does the reasoning of the Court." Id. 594 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added),
By contrast, the majority had stated specifically that a statement meeting the
requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 555 might nevertheless fail to satisfy the needs of a

reviewing court. 421 U.S. at 573. Thus, a rule based on such a statement might
nevertheless be remanded to the agency.
91
TnapxsE, supra note 11, § 6:6, at 468.
92
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n., 547 F.2d 633, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Tamm, J.,concurring in the

judgment), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For further discussion of
Judge Tamin's position, see text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.

93See generally Williams, supra note 37.
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ings, as at least the Department of Agriculture apparently did.94 Indeed, the basic underpinnings of these cases always have been
shaky; the cases have been a phenomenon only of the District of
Columbia Circuit.
(3) The final question, and certainly an intriguing one, is
whether, in light of the experimentation of the 1970's and in response to Vermont Yankee, Congress should revise the rulemaking
statute. Davis believes that revision now is both unwise and unnecessary. In the "Summary and Perspective" section of the chapter
on rulemaking, he states that "Congress could probably salvage
what the Court has destroyed, but the time has not yet arrived for
a codification of the new law of rulemaking procedure for it is still
growing too rapidly. It should be allowed to grow further." 05 He
concludes both the rulemaking chapter and the volume by reiterating his opposition to statutory change: "At the appropriate time, a
codification of [rulemaking procedure] may be written into § 553
of the Administrative Procedure Act, but not until the rapid development of it has slowed down." 96
I disagree. I believe that we now have enough experience to
assess which rulemaking procedures work well and which do not.
Spurred by the uncertain implications of Vermont Yankee, we
should now begin the process of amending 5 U.S.C. § 553. As
first steps, I envision not only a study to revise section 553, but also
a systematic review of all provisions in the numerous substantive
statutes that impose rulemaking procedures. I believe that most of
these provisions should be repealed in favor of the revised section 553
process; there may, however, be a few exceptions, in which a special
procedure seems peculiarly appropriate for a specific grant of rulemaking authority. Although the development and enactment of
such a statute is a major task, it should produce a kind of order
that does not now exist in the area of rulemaking procedures.
Despite Davis' professed uncertainty on this issue, and his
feeling that further experimentation is needed prior to any attempts at revision, his chapter on rulemaking procedure reveals
that only a few problem areas remain. They include: the extent
94 See id. 436-42. The danger of an overly formalized rulemaking process was
also mentioned by Judge Tamm, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 660-61 (Tamm, J., concurring in
the result), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). It was later invoked by
Mr. Justice Relnquist as the policy justification underlying Vermont Yankee. 435
U.S. at 547-48 (1978).
95
TamA-rs., supra note 11, § 6:39, at 630.
90 Id. 634.
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to which agencies should make findings of fact in rulemaking; the
extent to which cross-examination should be provided; whether the
agency "record" may be supplemented after the comment period
has ended; and the kind of ex parte contact rule, if any, that should
be applied. As has already been suggested,97 Davis tends to concentrate on reported cases and statutory provisions rather than on
actual agency experience. Quite a bit is presently known about
agency experience with these problems; a systematic study could
illuminate those problems already identified and reveal additional
ones.
Revision of section 553 would produce several significant advantages. The evolving concepts of a "rulemaking record" and
open pre-notice procedures have already led to many desirable innovations in recent years. Some of these appear in the Executive
Order (which will expire after two years); 98 some, in recent
legislation, such as the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977; 99 some,
in a series of non-binding recommendations by the Administrative
Conference; 100 and some, in the burgeoning legal literature.1 0 ' A
revised section 553 could adopt the most desirable of these innovations and make them uniformly applicable to all agencies with rulemaking authority. At the same time, the revision would foster a
dearer articulation of the appropriate standard of judicial review.
In this way, Congress could insure that informal rulemaking continues to be subjected to probing judicial review, even while eliminating trial-type proceedings and mandatory cross-examination 102 in
those classes of cases in which they are now required.
97

See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). See note 89 supra.
9942 U.S.C. §7607 (1976).
100 See generally the annual reports of the Administrative Conference of the
United States.
10 1 See generally Auerbach, Informed Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship
Between Administrative Proceduresand Judicial Review, 72 Nw. L. BEv. 15 (1977).
A partial list of the innovations from these sources includes the following: a
public agenda of rulemaking activities; a list of "significant" proceedings; a published
description of pre-rulemaking procedures; the use of advance notices of proposed
rulemaking; a public docket for each rulemaking proceeding; and the development
of the "record" in an open manner; mandatory oral, legislative-type hearings in all
"significant" proceedings; and clear guidelines specifying the amount and extent
of justification that the agency must show as a basis for its decision.
102 Davis continues to argue that cross-examination is appropriate for issues of
"specific fact." TnmxATs, supra note 11, § 6:20, at 542. See generally id. § 6:20.
While I do not disagree with this general formulation, it has proved impractical as
a mandatory requirement. Davis superficially analyzes the experience of the Federal
Trade Commission in one proceeding under the Maguuson-Moss amendments and
concludes that the problems lie with the administrators rather than with the requirement itself. However, my discussions with agency personnel and with the con98
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In my view, the principal effects of Vermont Yankee should be
to alert Congress to the inadequacy of the present section 553; to
prompt it to undertake a fresh study and review of all rulemaking
procedures; and ultimately, to spur it to revise and unify those
procedures. Should these events occur, Vermont Yankee may turn
out to be in fact a blessing.
sultant for the Administrative Conference who is studying the Magnuson-Moss Act
persuade me that mandatory cross-examination, even on the elusive issues that can
be labelled "specific," should never be required in general rulemaking proceedings.
If this question were reserved for agency discretion, most of the issues described by
Davis as requiring further study and development, see text accompanying note 97
supra, would disappear.
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